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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BILL OF 
ATTAINDER CLAUSE, THE USE OF SANCTIONS AS A 
REGULATORY TOOL FOR FOREIGN TRADE, AND 
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 
 
Alina Veneziano* 
 
The Chinese-based telecommunications giant, Huawei Technologies, has sued the 
U.S. government contending that the sanctions imposed upon it via legislation violate 
the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution.   Even though a district court has 
recently denied Huawei’s motion for summary judgment, this case presents an 
interesting question and under-examined issue as to whether the Bill of Attainder 
Clause applies to corporations in the first place.  The Supreme Court has never 
affirmatively stated whether corporations can sue under the Clause.  Lower courts 
have assumed that it does apply, though some have ruled against the corporate 
plaintiff on other grounds.  With the exception of the Second Circuit, no other court 
decision has found a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate 
entity.  This article departs from prior case law and scholarship by urging against the 
extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause to the corporate entity and is the first to 
present sustained arguments based on history, Supreme Court language, defamation 
law, state and federal regulatory powers, and foreign affairs to show that the Clause 
ought not be extended in this respect.  While acknowledging that the Second Circuit 
has found a violation of the Clause in favor of the corporate entity, this article criticizes 
the Second Circuit’s holding as flawed and incomplete.  Specifically, this article 
argues primarily that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects only personal dignitary 
interests.  First, it discusses that the history of the Clause indicates an individual-rights 
standpoint.  Second, it illuminates how all Supreme Court opinions that have found a 
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause have dealt with the natural person—either 
individually or as a part of an ascertainable group.  Third, even though corporations 
can sue for defamation, it argues that corporations cannot be analogized to individuals 
in this manner because the only cognizable injury a corporation can sustain is injury 
to its business and economic interests.  Fourth, it asserts that because the corporation 
is subject to both state and federal regulation by virtue of incorporation, it surrenders 
some of its privacy.  This article secondarily argues that corporate extension of the 
Bill of Attainder Clause will impede national security interests and foreign policy in 
three respects: by interfering with Congress’ ability to (1) sanction properly, (2) 
regulate foreign trade, and (3) respond swiftly to foreign policy issues such as threats 
to U.S. intelligence and cybersecurity.  Thus, as will be demonstrated, the Bill of 
Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution cannot be maintained by corporations 
because it only protects the personal dignitary interest of individuals and cannot be 
maintained due to Congress’ interests in preventing interference with foreign 
relations.  
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I. PRESENTING THE HUAWEI CASE AND U.S. BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article examines the relationship between the Bill of Attainder Clause in the 
U.S. Constitution,1 legislative sanctions, and corporate personhood for bill of attainder 
claims.2  It is written in light of the recent sanctions imposed by the 2019 National 
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) against Huawei Technologies and the 
subsequent lawsuit filed by Huawei against the U.S. government.  Huawei’s lawsuit 
alleged that certain provisions of the NDAA constitute a violation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.  In February 2020, a district court judge denied Huawei's motion for 
summary judgment and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment.3  
This Article discusses the very interesting and unsettled issue as to whether the 
protections of the Bill of Attainder Clause are applicable to corporations.  It ultimately 
concludes that the Clause is not applicable to the corporate entity based on history, 
precedent, and differences in injury and regulation between the natural person and the 
corporate entity as well concerns regarding foreign relations and Congress’ duties to 
regulate and respond to sensitive foreign policy issues.   
This Article proceeds in the following manner: Part I introduces the situation with 
Huawei Technologies (“Huawei”), the events leading up to the indictments against 
Huawei and some of its officers, as well as the subsequent complaint and motion for 
summary judgment filed by Huawei against the U.S. government, which was later 
denied.  Part I closes with a brief summary of the Bill of Attainder Clause, the status 
of corporate bill of attainder claims in the courts, and commentaries within the 
academic community, all of which largely assume that corporate bill of attainder 
claims are permissible.   
Part II analyzes the opinion from the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison v. 
Pataki.  This opinion is significant because it is the first decision to find a violation of 
the Bill of Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity.  Part III presents the main 
argument of this article, namely that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects only personal 
dignitary interests.  This Part criticizes the two holdings of Consolidated Edison as 
erroneous by failing to consider history and precedent as well as incomplete by 
declining to discuss how corporate injury and regulation are distinct from that of a 
natural person.  First, it discusses how the history of the Clause and Supreme Court 
decisions—which have all found violations of the Clause only with respect to 
individuals—both support an individualized approach.  Second, it demonstrates how 
 
*Alina Veneziano, Ph.D. Candidate, King’s College London; LL.M., New York University School of 
Law, 2019; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2018; M.B.A., Western Governors University; B.S., 
Accounting, Western Governors University.  Alina Veneziano is a registered attorney of the Bar of the State of 
New York.  She is grateful to the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their incredible edits throughout the 
publication process.  She thanks her family for their love and support. 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”) 
2 This article does not delve into analyses of punitive intent versus non-punitive regulation and instead 
presumes punitive intent in the 2019 NDAA in light of the Huawei case.  This article investigates the initial 
and most pressing issue of whether the Bill of Attainder Clause is properly applicable to the corporate entity. 
3 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv-
159-ALM (E.D. Tex., Feb. 18, 2020). 
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the inherent differences between the natural person and the corporation—such as 
injuries sustainable and state and federal regulation—prevent comparable treatment 
regarding bill of attainder claims.   
Part IV offers a subsidiary argument that supports the conclusion that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause is not applicable to corporations.  This argument contends that 
Congress must retain the flexibility needed to respond to foreign security issues.  
Therefore, Congress’ ability to sanction, regulate foreign commerce, and respond to 
sensitive foreign policy issues must not be hindered.  Part IV concludes that extending 
the protections of the Bill of Attainder Clause to the corporate entity would complicate 
these purposes.  Part V reiterates the conclusion that this Article promotes: that the 
personal dignitary interests protected by the Clause and Congress’ duty to defend 
national security interests and respond to foreign policy issues mandate that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause not extend to corporations.    
 
B.       THE INDICTMENTS AND THE COMPLAINT 
 
In 2019, two indictments were returned against Huawei, charging it with theft of 
trade secrets conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to defraud the United 
States, among other charges.4  Huawei filed its complaint in March 2019 in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and subsequently a motion for summary 
judgment in May 2019.5  Huawei’s claim argues that Section 889 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) of 2019, which prohibits the use of Huawei 
equipment and certain telecommunications services by U.S. government agencies, is 
unconstitutional.6  Specifically, Huawei relies on three arguments to support its 
position that Section 889 of the 2019 NDAA is unconstitutional. 
First, as its main argument, Huawei argues that the Act violates the Bill of 
Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution by targeting it for punishment.7  Second, 
Huawei contends that the Act violates due process of law by severely curtailing its 
ability to do business and by branding it a tool of the Chinese government.8  Lastly, 
Huawei asserts that Section 889 violates the Constitution’s vesting clause and 
separation of powers by legislatively adjudicating Huawei as guilty rather than leaving 
this issue to either the Executive or the Judiciary.9   
 
4 See Indictment, United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., No. 2:19-cr-00010-RSM (W.D. 
Wash., Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1124996/download; see also Superseding 
Indictment, United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Cr. No. 18-457 (S-2) (AMD) (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1125021/download.  
5 See Complaint, Huawei Technologies USA, Inc. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv-00159 
 (E.D. Tex. 2019), https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/huawei.pdf?mod=article_inline; see 
also Motion for Summary Judgment, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v. United States, No. 4:19-cv-159-ALM 
(E.D. Tex., May 28, 2019), https://games-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/a06cf0ee-
d366-41f9-8ead-147f6a0513bb/note/04dd5695-718f-45fd-9eb8-a94ab8c6bc03.pdf#page=1.  
6 See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 
889, 132 Stat. 1636, 1917 (2019). 
7 See Complaint, Huawei, No. 4:19-cv-00159, at *3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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In February 2020, the district court judge denied Huawei’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Nevertheless, the issue of the Bill of Attainder Clause’s applicability 
remains a critical topic for debate. 
 
C.       THE U.S. BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE 
 
This article examines the crux of Huawei’s argument: the alleged violation of the 
Bill of Attainder Clause.10  Huawei’s claim raised the question of whether the Bill of 
Attainder Clause applies to corporations in the first place.  Article I, Section 9 reads as 
follows: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”11  The text of the 
Clause does not mention “person” or “individual,” nor does it reference any intended 
recipient of its protections against attainder.12  Because the text of the Clause is of no 
avail, Supreme Court precedent must be consulted.  But here, too, the Supreme Court 
has never ruled on the applicability of the Bill of Attainder Clause to corporations.13  
With the exception of one opinion from the Second Circuit, the circuit courts have not 
found a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity.  
Instead, these lower courts—excluding the Second Circuit—have largely assumed that 
the Clause is applicable to the corporate entity,14 though have ruled against the 
corporate plaintiff on other grounds.15  Additionally, scholarship from the academic 
 
10 This article examines the threshold question of whether the U.S. Bill of Attainder Clause is applicable 
to corporations such as Huawei.  Huawei’s additional claims asserting violations of the Due Process and 
Vesting Clauses are not the subject of this article and are only indirectly addressed. 
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (There is also an equivalent prohibition for states in U.S. Const. art. I, § 10: 
“No State shall . . . pass any bill of attainder.”) 
12 Id. 
13 See SBC Communications v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the Court has 
yet to reach th[is] question directly”). 
14 Opinions and briefs pay scant attention to the question of whether the Bill of Attainder Clause applies 
to corporations and largely presume that it is applicable to the corporate entity.  See Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. 
United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 909 F.3d 446, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that the D.C. 
Circuit has “previously assumed without deciding” the Clause’s applicability to corporations and because the 
government did not argue that the Clause only protects individuals and because there are no arguments to the 
contrary, “we shall continue to assume that the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to corporations”); see also 
ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court 
has never had occasion to rule on the issue,” the Second Circuit has previously held that the scope of the 
clause includes corporations); see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 
2002) (noting that the “applicability of the Bill of Attainder Clause to corporations remains unsettled in every 
circuit” but because the Supreme Court has intimidated at its extension without discussion and because several 
Courts of Appeals “have expressly assumed [it] without deciding that the Clause is applicable to 
corporations,” the court noted that the Bill of Attainder clause “is one of the constitutional rights enjoyed by 
corporations.”); see also BellSouth Corp. v. FCC (“BellSouth II”), 162 F.3d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting 
that, as in BellSouth I, both parties assume that the Clause protects corporations and individuals and that “we 
make the same assumption here”); see also BellSouth Corp. v. FCC ("BellSouth I"), 144 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (stating that “[it] assume[s], as do the parties, that the Bill of Attainder Clause protects corporations 
as well as individuals” and noting that the “clause’s coverage clearly seems to include at least closely held 
corporations, where an attainder would fall on a narrowly circumscribed, easily identified group of flesh-and-
blood people,” but “[g]iven the parties’ shared assumption, we will not explore the issue further”); see also 
SBC Communications, 154 F.3d 234 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)(observing that even if it is assumed that the Bill of 
Attainder applies to corporations, the claimant’s argument fails but acknowledging that the answer to this issue 
“does seem likely”). 
15 These decisions generally rule against the plaintiff on other reasons, obviating any need to decide 
whether the Clause applies to corporations.  See Kaspersky, 909 F.3d at 460 (holding the provision was not a 
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community reflects the common consensus that the Bill of Attainder Clause does apply 
to corporations.16  Thus, the Second Circuit stands as a notable exception on this issue 
and is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN CONSOLIDATED EDISON V. PATAKI 
 
A.       FACTS 
 
In 2002, the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. 
Pataki17 became the only court to find a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in 
favor of the corporate entity.18  Consolidated Edison Company (“Con Edison”)—a 
provider of electrical power to New York City—experienced a power outage from a 
defective generator, of which it was aware.19  The New York legislature passed a law 
in response to the power outage at one of Con Edison's power plants.20  Among some 
of the key provisions in the law were legislative findings that all operators of nuclear 
facilities have “a high duty of care to protect the health, safety and economic interests 
of its customers” and that by continuing to operate steam generators known to be 
defective and therefore increasing the risk of radioactive release, “Consolidated Edison 
Company failed to exercise reasonable care on behalf of the health, safety and 
 
bill of attainder violation “given the reasonable balance between the burden imposed by section 1634 and the 
nonpunitive national security objective it furthers”); see also ACORN, 618 F.3d at 142 (holding that the 
“statements by a handful of 
legislators are insufficient to establish—by themselves—the clearest proof of punitive intent necessary 
for a bill of attainder”); see also BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 680 (holding that the provision is not a bill of 
attainder “because it does not inflict ‘punishment’ on BellSouth”); see also BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67 
(holding that the “distinction drawn by Congress seems quite understandable without resort to inferences of 
punitive purpose,” precluding a finding of a bill of attainder violation); see also SBC Communications, 154 
F.3d at 242–44 (holding that there was no bill of attainder violation since the provision was not punitive 
“because they do not impose a perpetual bar,” “because they serve a nonpunitive purpose: attempting to ensure 
fair competition in the markets,” “because neither their terms nor their legislative history demonstrates the 
‘smoking gun’ evidence of punitive intent,” and “because they were part of a larger quid pro quo” 
representative of a “compromise on a massive issue of public policy”).  See infra, Part III.D. for an elaboration 
of the facts and holdings of these opinions.  
16 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 112 
(2014) (observing that even though a corporation is created by law, it operates to accomplish important goals 
of individuals and furthers the public good); see also Karey P. Pond, Constitutional Law – The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: When Legislative Regulation Becomes Unconstitutional Punishment, 22 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 309 (2000) (noting that because the Bill of Attainder Clause acts as a safeguard 
against legislative determinations of guilt and because corporations are subject to criminal law, “it is only 
natural that the prohibition against legislative punishments be applicable to corporations”); see also Thomas 
Lee, Constitutional Law-Bill of Attainder-Fifth Circuit Holds That the Special Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Are Not a Bill of Attainder, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (1999) 
(promoting an approach that would extend the Bill of Attainder Clause only to “protect political minorities 
from targeted punishment by majoritarian legislatures” but that the Clause should not protect corporations 
“from particularized economic legislation”); see also JOHN T. MULLIGAN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 7 (1913) 
(contending that a corporation is merely “a collection of many individuals, united into one body . . . with 
capacity of acting in many respects as an individual”). 
17 See generally Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002). 
18 Id. at 355. 
19 Id. at 343-44. 
20 Id. at 343. 
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economic interests of its customers.”21  It continued by declaring that “it would not be 
in the public interest for the company to recover from ratepayers any costs” relating to 
the power outage.22  Specifically, “the New York state public service commission shall 
prohibit the Consolidated Edison Company from recovering from its ratepayers any 
costs associated with replacing the power from such facility.”23   
Con Edison brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of 
New York, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief barring enforcement 
of the statute based on violations of the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I, Section 
10,24 amongst other claims.25  The District Court held that the New York legislature 
passed a Bill of Attainder because “the legislature took it upon itself to determine the 
[Con Edison’s] guilt and to impose the sanction it deemed appropriate,” which 
demonstrated the legislative intent to punish.26  The Second Circuit affirmed.27 
The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s definition of a bill of attainder 
as set forth in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.28  The Court in Nixon stated 
that a statute can be a bill of attainder only if: (1) it “determines guilt and inflicts 
punishment,” (2) “upon an identifiable individual,” and (3) “without provision of the 
protections of a judicial trial.”29  The Circuit immediately concluded that factor (3)—
no protections of a judicial trial—is “incontrovertible” in that the bill was passed using 
the legislative process without the protections of a judicial trial.30  Thus, only two 
factors were at issue for the Second Circuit: whether Con Edison is “an ‘individual’ 
that may invoke the protection of the Clause” and whether the legislative provision 
“determines guilt” and “inflicts punishment.”31  The Second Circuit answered both 
questions in the affirmative.   
 
B.       FIRST HOLDING: CORPORATIONS ARE INDIVIDUALS FOR 
BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAIMS 
 
The Second Circuit analyzed the Clause’s applicability to corporations as 
individuals first.  After listing which constitutional rights are applicable and 
inapplicable to corporations, it noted that the Supreme Court had reasoned that the 
distinction between rights that can be asserted by corporations and those that cannot is 
because “certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and 
other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been 
 
21 Id. at 344. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
25 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 345 (These other claims raised by Con Edison included violations of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Supremacy Clause, and the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10.  But because this article 
is focused solely on the connection—if any—between the Bill of Attainder Clause(s) and corporations, the 
analysis of Con Edison is limited to the Bill of Attainder claim.) 
26 See Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pataki, 117 F. Supp.2d 257, 265–71 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
27 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 345. 
28 See generally Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
29 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 346 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468). 
30 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 346. 
31 Id. 
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limited to the protection of individuals” and that whether the right is personal depends 
on its “nature, history, and purpose.”32 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the applicability of the Clause to 
corporations “remains unsettled in every circuit” but observed subtle and brief 
indications from the Supreme Court that could indicate corporate applicability.33  For 
instance, in United States v. Lovett, the Supreme Court alluded to this possibility by 
stating that “legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named 
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict 
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the 
Constitution.”34  Additionally, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, the Court indicated, in 
dicta, that the Clause may target a “single individual or firm.”35  Further, in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court stated that the Clause gives “protections 
for individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to 
nonjudicial determinations of guilt.”36  The Second Circuit immediately foreclosed the 
issue that there could be a difference between corporations and private groups by 
reasoning that the mere reference to private groups by the Court in Katzenbach 
“plainly contemplates protection for some entities in addition to individual natural 
persons.”37  Because of these indications, the court concluded that the Clause is not a 
“purely personal” guarantee and is, therefore, “one of the constitutional rights enjoyed 
by corporations.”38   
In making this conclusion, the Second Circuit contended that the “historical 
function” of the Clause has been to safeguard the “procedural protections of the 
judicial process” and is, therefore, associated with the “right to procedural due 
process.”39  It also contended that cases where the Supreme Court refused to apply 
constitutional rights to corporations involved “competing state interests in regulating 
corporate conduct and investigating corporate wrongdoing,” thus mandating some 
degree of “transparency.”40  For instance, the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. United 
States, refused to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to 
corporations based on the “visitatorial power”41 that the state retains in the corporation 
after incorporation.  Also, the Court, in United States v. Morton Salt, determined that 
corporations enjoy narrower rights to privacy due to the state’s “legitimate right” in 
ensuring corporate behavior comports with “the law and the public interest.”42  But the 
Second Circuit distinguished these cases from the one at hand by noting that although 
New York has an interest in investigating and regulating the malfeasance of 
corporations, “it has no interest in inflicting punishment for such malfeasance on the 
corporation's shareholders through the legislative process,” especially where there was 
 
32 Id. at 347 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14 (1978)). 
33 Id, 292 F.3d at 347.  
34 Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946)) (emphasis added). 
35 Id. at 347 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995)) (emphasis added). 
36 Id. at 347 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 348. 
41 Id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382–84 (1911)). 
42 Id. (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). 
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an existing administrative procedure to follow to vindicate the alleged wrongdoing 
such as the “prudence review process.”43  
 
C.       SECOND HOLDING: THE PROVISION DETERMINES GUILT AND 
INFLICTS PUNISHMENT 
 
Turning next to “guilt,” the Second Circuit noted that in order to find a violation 
of the Bill of Attainder Clause, the provision must have a “retrospective focus”—
meaning it must “define[] past conduct as wrongdoing and then impose[] punishment 
on that past conduct.”44  The Circuit had no problem concluding that the New York 
legislature considered Con Edison guilty, as evidenced by the statute’s focus on 
“conduct related to a single, past incident . . . as the basis for the sanction it imposes.”45  
Regarding the court’s analysis of “punishment,” it went through the three factors 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Nixon to determine if the provision was punitive: 
“(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative 
punishment; (2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of 
burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’; 
and (3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a [legislative] intent to punish.’”46    
For the traditional or historical factor, the Second Circuit listed examples of 
punitive per se punishments such as “imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive 
confiscation of property . . . [and] a legislative enactment barring designated 
individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations.”47  
The court determined that the only traditional punishment implicated here is the 
“punitive confiscation of property” because the provision “clearly deprived Con Ed of 
a property interest” of “approximately $250 million that it would otherwise have been 
able to obtain from its customers.”48  However, the court noted that the “deprivation” 
here is not the same as a “confiscation,” so it instead did “not decide whether [the 
provision] imposes a traditional attainder.”49  Regarding the functional factor, the 
Second Circuit noted several nonpunitive purposes, such as “prevent[ing] Con Ed’s 
ratepayers from being forced to bear costs that the legislature viewed as negligently 
incurred,” “deter[ring] similar conduct by Con Ed and other public utilities in the 
future,” regulating monopolies which “do[] not face the same incentives to minimize 
costs as does an actor in a competitive market,” and “deter[ring] negligent conduct 
with an eye toward protecting public health.”50  However, the court noted that the “type 
and severity of burdens imposed”51 by this provision “leads us to a different 
conclusion.”52  Because “it is undisputed that Con Ed would have been allowed to pass 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 349. See also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73. 
45 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 349. 
46 Id. at 350 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475–76, 478). 
47 Id. at 351 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473–74). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 351–52. 
51 Id. at 352 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475). 
52 Id. at 353. 
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through to ratepayers the costs of covering power demand while replacing the 
generators during a scheduled outage,” the court concluded that nothing “other than 
punishment can justify forcing Con Ed to absorb those same costs after the accidental 
outage.”53  Further, because there were alternatives available that did not include 
forcing Con Edison to absorb all costs, “the legislature piled on a burden that was 
obviously disproportionate to the harm caused,” and therefore, punitive intent was 
clearly demonstrated.54  Lastly, the court observed several instances of a legislative 
intent to punish under the motivational factor, such as statements by legislators. 
Examples include “Con Edison has done a terrible thing” or that Con Edison “should 
certainly be penalized.”55  Therefore, the provision was a “punitive” measure.56 
 
D.       CONCLUSION 
 
Thus, a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause was affirmed in favor of Con 
Edison, making this holding from the Second Circuit the first time a judicial opinion 
has found a violation of the Clause in favor of the corporate entity.57  There have been 
no further decisions by the appellate courts, or any other court, that have found a 
violation of the Clause for corporations.   
In summary, the Second Circuit in Con Edison upheld the violation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity based on two reasonings: first, by 
holding that the Clause was applicable to corporations and, second, by holding that the 
provision at issue demonstrated the requisite retroactive imposition of guilt and 
punishment required to find a bill of attainder.  Its first holding determined that the 
intended recipients of the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to corporations.  Its second 
holding reasoned that the congressional intent by the New York legislature in the 
statutory provision that forced Con Edison to absorb the costs of the power outage it 
caused was a bill of attainder.  Sections A and B of Part III of this article set forth 
arguments as to why the first holding of Con Edison is clearly erroneous.  Sections C 
and D of Part III demonstrate how the second holding of Con Edison is an incomplete 
analysis of this issue.  Part IV then presents an alternative argument as to why corporate 
extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause is a hazardous decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 354. 
55 Id. at 355–56. 
56 Id. at 355. 
57 Id. at 356. 
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III. THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE PROTECTS ONLY PERSONAL DIGNITARY 
INTERESTS 
 
A.      THE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE 
DEMONSTRATES AN INDIVIDUAL-BASED STANDPOINT 
 
English law, early commentaries, the Revolutionary era, and the U.S. Founding 
Fathers have all understood attainder as a tool used against natural persons.  First, 
beginning in the sixteenth century, the English monarchy used attainder to execute 
individuals who had been disloyal to the Crown.58  Second, commentaries by jurists, 
such as William Blackstone, have described attainder as a “sentence of death.”59  
Blackstone asserted that an aggregate corporation “is not liable . . . to attainder” for 
“[i]t cannot be executor or administrator, or perform any personal duties . . . for it 
cannot take an oath . . . cannot be seized of lands . . . for such kind of confidence is 
foreign to the ends of its institution.”60  Additionally, Justice Joseph Story defined 
attainder as a form of “capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high 
offences . . . without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”61  
Third, attainder had been used by the thirteen colonies during the Revolutionary War 
to confiscate the estates of Tories who had remained loyal to England.62  Lastly, the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution—having understood attainder from English law as 
“parliamentary acts sentencing named persons to death without the benefit of a judicial 
trial”63—saw its use as “dangerous” and capable of turning the liberty of free people 
and government into a “mockery of common sense.”64  They sought to prevent 
attainder in the new American nation, and the records of the Federal Convention reveal 
that the prohibition on bills of attainder in the U.S. Constitution was agreed to 
unanimously.65   
This desire by the Founding Fathers to prevent bills of attainder in U.S. 
jurisprudence demonstrates a focus on protecting the individual from the original 
consequences of attainder.  The Second Circuit, in Consolidated Edison, 
acknowledged the same in its opinion by quoting Supreme Court dicta, in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which stated that whether a right is personal 
 
58 See Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England from the Accession of James the Second 
Passim (The Aldine Press, 1848) (discussing early instances of attainer within the history of England such as 
the attainder of Cromwell during the reign of Henry VIII, the attainder of the late King Richard III, and the act 
of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament of James II). 
59 See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) (reprinted in Founders’ 
Constitution, William Blackstone, Commentaries 4:373–79, vol. III 343–45 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987)). 
60 Id. at 464 (emphasis added). 
61 See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 1338–39 (1833) (reprinted 
in Founders’ Constitution, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3: §§ 1338-39 1833, vol. III 353–
54 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner ed., 1987)) (emphasis added). 
62 See Charles H. Wilson Jr., The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 
54 CAL. L. REV. 212, 216 (1966). 
63 See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 62 (emphasis added). 
64 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 444 (1965). 
65 See James Madison, Records of the Federal Convention 2:375, in 3 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 347 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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“depends on [its] nature, history, and purpose.”66  Here, the historical meaning of the 
term cannot be based on anything other than an individual-based standpoint as a 
“purely personal” guarantee.67   
 
B.      SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FINDING BILL OF ATTAINDER 
VIOLATIONS HAVE ALL INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS 
 
On only five occasions has the Supreme Court invalidated laws under the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.68  All cases involved the interests of an individual or group of 
individuals.  Starting in the 1860s, after the Civil War, the Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Garland, Cummings v. Missouri and the companion case Pierce v. Carskadon, 
invalidated provisions requiring individuals take loyalty oaths prior to employment 
asserting that they never supported the Confederate Government.69  In Ex parte 
Garland and Pierce, the federal law requiring this oath was directed at “every person 
elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United 
States.”70  The provision in the state constitution requiring the oath in Cummings was 
directed at anyone seeking a professional license and extended to “every person 
holding . . . any of the offices.”71  
About a century later, the Supreme Court found violations of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause in United States v. Lovett72 and United States v. Brown,73 decided in 1946 and 
1965, respectively.  In Lovett, a special subcommittee of the Appropriations 
Committee had determined that Watson, Dodd, and Lovett—government workers—
were charged with engaging in “subversive activity” and were therefore not entitled to 
payment for their federal work.74  The Supreme Court held the provision “was designed 
to apply to particular individuals” and operated “‘as a legislative decree of perpetual 
exclusion’ from a chosen vocation.”75  About two decades later, the Supreme Court in 
Brown invalidated a section of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
as a bill of attainder.76  That Section “conditioned a union’s access to the National 
Labor Relations Board upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union’s officers 
attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party.”77  
Brown—an “open and avowed Communist”—had been elected to the Executive Board 
and was subsequently charged with violating this Section.78  The Court noted that the 
 
66 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 347 (2002) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 778-79 n.14 (1978)). 
67 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701 (1944)). 
68 See Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. 234 
(1872); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866). 
69 See generally Cummings, 71 U.S. at 277; see also generally Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 333; see also 
companion case Pierce, 83 U.S. at 234. 
70 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added); see also Pierce, 83 U.S. at 239. 
71 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 317. 
72 See generally Lovett, 328 U.S. at 303. 
73 See generally Brown, 381 U.S. at 437. 
74 See Lovett, 328 U.S at 305, 310–11. 
75 Id. at 316 (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 377). 
76 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 438–40. 
77 Id. at 439. 
78 Id. at 440. 
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Clause ought to be “read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar,” the evil of 
which is “legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated 
persons or groups.”79  In finding a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in Brown, 
the Supreme Court held that the provision “designates in no uncertain terms the 
persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office 
without incurring criminal liability.”80   
Thus, all five cases where the Supreme Court has found a violation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause involved an individual or group of individuals—whether named or 
clearly ascertainable.  Specifically, the provisions struck as bills of attainder in these 
cases “stigmatized [the claimant’s] reputation and seriously impaired their chance to 
earn a living.”81  However, corporations do not “earn a living;” instead, the creation of 
a corporation is “necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public,” to carry out 
those rights of the public by maintaining perpetual succession as “artificial persons,” 
as Blackstone had stated.82   
The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison, however, relied on language from 
Supreme Court opinions, such as the Court’s reference in Katzenbach to “individual 
persons and private groups,”83 to conclude that the Supreme Court must have 
contemplated protections under the Clause in addition to individual natural persons.84  
But the Second Circuit failed to explain how this reference to “groups” automatically 
includes the corporate entity.  It also failed to explain why “groups” does not include 
anything other than the corporate entity.  To the contrary, the language in Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with “groups” are really about individuals who are part of an 
ascertainable group. 
In American Communications Association v. Douds, the Supreme Court, in a 
plurality decision in 1950, described the prior decisions that had found violations of 
the Clause as involving “the proscription of certain occupations to a group classified 
according to belief and loyalty.”85  The claimant in Douds was a union.86  The Court 
noted that the provision in Douds prohibiting “members of those groups identified in 
[the provision]” from serving as union leaders unless they “renounce the[ir] 
allegiances” was enacted to protect the public from Communism.87  Additionally, in 
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,88 the 
Supreme Court defined attainder as the singling out of an individual for punishment 
“whether the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which, 
 
79 Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 450 (emphasis added). 
81 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 314. 
82 See Blackstone, supra note 59, at 464 (William Blackstone had also written on the differences between 
the natural person and the corporate entity.  It is interesting that Blackstone placed the chapter “Of 
Corporations” under the First Book titled “of the Rights of Persons” as opposed to the Second Book titled “of 
the Rights of Things.”  But he then goes on to qualify this classification by noting that corporations were 
created to carry on the rights of people—rights that people cannot accomplish because they are mortal). 
83 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added). 
84 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 347. 
85 See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950) (referring to the Court’s earlier 
holdings in Lovett, Ex parte Garland, and Cummings). 
86 Id. at 387. 
87 Id. at 414. 
88 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
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because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons.”89  
Thus, the “terms of conduct” denotes the characteristics of the group and leads to the 
“designation of particular persons” within that group.  Further, in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, the Supreme Court recounted prior Supreme Court 
decisions finding violations of the Clause for both (1) individuals, such as United 
States v. Lovett,90 which barred named individuals from government employment and 
(2) groups, such as United States v. Brown91 and Cummings v. Missouri,92 which barred 
Communist Party members from offices in labor unions and clergymen from ministry 
without taking a loyalty oath, respectively.93  Therefore, more often than not, history 
shows that the claimants asserting bill of attainder claims have been individuals as 
members of groups.  None have compared the corporate entity to a “group.” 
Instead, the corporation is more comparable to the duties and characteristics of a 
state.  For instance, even though the Second Circuit relied on the language in 
Katzenbach regarding “individual persons and private groups,”94 the Court in 
Katzenbach also observed some limits of the term person.  It cautioned that the word 
“person” cannot be expanded to include states, as the state “does [not] have standing 
as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal 
Government.”95  This suggests a special status vested in states as distinct from 
“individual persons and private groups”—something that can be compared to 
corporations.96 
Without more, however, the Second Circuit was simply in error to conclude that 
Katzenbach’s reference to “private groups” “plainly contemplates protection for some 
entities in addition to individual natural persons,”97 especially in light of Supreme 
Court decisions describing groups.  The more logical reasoning is that the term 
“group”—as interpreted in dicta by the Supreme Court—only refers to individuals as 
a part of a collection of persons, such as federal court officers,98 medical 
professionals,99 convicted felons,100 members of the Communist Party,101 labor 
unions,102 clergy members,103 or even males,104 as some examples.  Thus, this 
 
89 Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
90 See generally Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
91 See generally Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
92 See generally Cummings, 71 U.S. 277 (1867). 
93 See Nixon, 433 U.S. 425, 473–74 (1977). 
94 See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 347 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)). 
95 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24 (referring to the Bill of Attainder Clause, amongst some of these 
protections that the state does not have standing to assert against the government). 
96 See discussion infra Part III.C. (on the treatment given to corporations under defamation law), Part 
III.D. (of the corporation’s limited privacy rights due to interests in state and federal regulation of 
corporations). 
97 See Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 347. 
98 See generally Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866). 
99 See generally Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
100 See generally Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
101 See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603 (1960). 
102 See generally Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
103 See generally Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866). 
104 See generally Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984). 
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demonstrates that the Court’s references to “groups” describe ascertainable, specified 
persons.105  Because a corporation is not a “group” in this respect—as the Second 
Circuit had determined—the Bill of Attainder Clause cannot apply to corporations 
based on this reasoning, and the Second Circuit was in error to do so. 
 
C.       CORPORATIONS—AS BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS—CAN 
ONLY SUSTAIN ECONOMIC INJURIES IN DEFAMATION 
CASES, NOT INJURIES TO PERSONAL DIGNITY 
 
A corporation does not possess personal dignitary interests and, while they can 
sue for defamation, the only cognizable injury a corporation can suffer is injury to its 
economic and business interests.  The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Pataki failed to account for or even discuss the inherent differences between a natural 
person and a corporation.106  These differences in types of sufferable injuries bear 
reconciliation.  Section C discusses corporate defamation and, consequently, the 
injuries a corporation can sustain. 
With respect to corporations, William L. Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts 
notes that “[a] corporation is regarded as having no reputation in any personal sense, 
so that it cannot be defamed by words.”107  Nevertheless, it has the “prestige and 
standing in the business in which it is engaged” such that language that affects its 
character may be actionable.108  Further, the Restatement (Third) of Torts defines 
defamation of a corporation as the publication of a statement that “tends to prejudice 
[the corporation] in the conduct of its trade or business or to deter third persons from 
dealing with it.”109   
New York Times v. Sullivan is the seminal Supreme Court case establishing the 
standard for defamation plaintiffs.110  In Sullivan, decided in 1964, an elected official 
sued for libel in connection with an advertisement in defendant’s newspaper.111  The 
Court held that public officials may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood 
unless he or she proves that the statement was made with “actual malice.”112  In the 
consolidated cases Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, the 
 
105 As an example of a recent circuit case from the D.C. Circuit that found a violation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause in favor of a natural person based on a marred reputation, see Foretich v. United States, 351 
F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The Act at issue in Foretich allowed the daughter to choose whether she wanted 
to see her father, whom her mother had accused of sexually abusing the child over the father’s repeated and 
vehement denials.  Id. at 1224.  The D.C. Circuit, in invalidating this provision, held that a violation of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause will be found where there is an “extraordinary imbalance between the burden imposed and 
the alleged nonpunitive purpose” and if it appears that the provision does not support the alleged purpose of 
Congress, and if the legislative means do not appear rationally to further that alleged purpose.”  Id. at 1223.  
The D.C. Circuit also asserted that the violation of the Clause imposed upon the father the “opprobrium of 
being branded” with a serious offense and “inflict[ed] significant and costly injury to [his] reputation.”  Id. at 
1220, 1223. 
106 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002). 
107 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 745 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added). 
108 Id. 
109 See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 561 (Am. Law Inst. 1987). 
110 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
111 Id. at 256. 
112 Id. at 279–80. 
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Court extended the standard to “public figures.”113  The Court, in a plurality opinion in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, held that the Sullivan standard even applies to a private 
person if the defamatory statement concerned a “subject of public or general 
interest.”114  However, three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme 
Court drew two distinctions between public figures and private individuals.115  First, 
public officials and public figures can better “counteract false statements,” compared 
to individuals who are “therefore more vulnerable to injury.”116  Second, those 
involved in “public affairs” inevitably “run[] the risk of closer public scrutiny.”117  The 
Court’s distinction between the types of claimants is based on differences in status and 
power.   
The Supreme Court has not specified whether nor to what extent the “public 
figure” as per Gertz or “public interest” as per Rosenbloom standard is applicable to 
corporations in corporate defamation cases.  Therefore, it has been the lower courts 
that have tried to flesh out the connection between corporate defamation suits and 
standards of proof.  Lower courts have used either the Rosenbloom or Gertz standard 
with corporate plaintiffs in defamation cases.  As an example of the former, the D.C. 
District Court in Martin Marietta v. Evening Star Newspaper followed Rosenbloom’s 
“public interest” test and held that a corporate claimant in a defamation suit must prove 
that the statement was made with actual malice whenever the statement involves 
“matters of legitimate public interest.”118  It noted that when individuals assume 
positions of public importance, “they sacrifice their private lives.”119  Corporations, on 
the other hand, do not have private lives to begin with and, consequently, must be 
denied full protection from libel.120  The corporate entity “never has a private life to 
lose.”121  Thus, the interests the Court in Gertz sought to protect, on the other hand, 
were those of “a highly personal nature” and not those associated with corporate 
activity.122  As an example of a lower court utilizing Gertz’s “public figure” test for 
the corporate plaintiff, the District Court for the Southern District of New York in 
Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's held that the corporate plaintiff was a public figure 
because it was a “large corporation with more than a billion dollars in assets,” there 
had been “great public interest” in its activities in recent years, and its “shares [were] 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.”123  Therefore, its industry was “a field 
subject to close state regulation.”124  Thus, because the corporate plaintiff had assumed 
the “prominence in the affairs of society,” it had to prove actual malice.125     
 
113 See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967). 
114 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plurality opinion).   
115 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
116 Id. at 344. 
117 Id. 
118 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956 (D.D.C. 1976). 
119 Id. at 955. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. (emphasis added). 
122 Id. 
123 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (corporate claimant was 
in the insurance industry). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1347, 1350 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)). 
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Nevertheless, even if the standard under defamation law for the corporation can 
be analogized to the individual, the injury cannot be.  Again, it has been the lower 
courts that have articulated the “injury” of a corporation in defamation suits and the 
damages available.  For instance, the D.C. District Court noted that corporate 
defamation occurs “only by imputation about its financial soundness or business 
ethics.”126  It may only recover actual damages in the form of lost profits.127  This 
difference in corporate treatment reflects something logically and factually distinct 
from the defamation of a natural person.  Consequently, the D.C. District Court in 
Martin Marietta noted that a corporate libel action is not “a basic of our constitutional 
system.”128  The D.C. Circuit has also been vocal on its stance as to the difference 
between corporate and individual reputation.129  It recently acknowledged that the 
“brand of infamy or disloyalty” is most applicable to “flesh-and-blood humans,” even 
though corporations may derive substantial financial value from their products’ 
reputation.130  To a corporation, the D.C. Circuit noted, reputation is an “asset” to be 
“cultivate[d], manage[d], and monetize[d]”131  Therefore, when dealing with the scope 
of a constitutional guarantee, any analogy between situations where the claimant is an 
individual to one where the claimant is a corporation “must necessarily take into 
account this difference.”132   
In Con Edison, both Con Edison and the Second Circuit conceded that Con Edison 
lost money in being unable to pass the costs on to its ratepayers.  In fact, the court 
determined that the provision “clearly deprived Con Ed of a property interest” that cost 
the corporation “approximately $250 million that it would otherwise have been able to 
obtain from its customers.”133  Because Con Edison could not pass these costs on to its 
customers, it had to internalize the increased costs of about $ 250 million.134  In other 
words, Con Edison had to absorb the costs itself and hence suffered an injury of $250 
million, which led the corporation to file suit in the District Court for the Northern 
District of New York.135  Therefore, this injury in the form of financial loss cannot be 
equated to a dignitary harm that “stigmatize[s] [its] reputation,” as Supreme Court 
language has dictated.136  
Thus, consensus within the Supreme Court and the lower courts has long reflected 
the several distinctions between the corporate versus individual status and also 
between the corporate versus individual recovery in defamation suits.  And although 
injury to the economic interests of a corporation may be actionable via defamation law, 
it cannot be maintained under the Bill of Attainder Clause because corporations cannot 
suffer personal, dignitary interests.  For instance, the Second Circuit admitted that Con 
 
126 See Golden Palace, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974). 
127 See Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
128 See Martin Marietta Corp., 417 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341). 
129 See infra, Part IV.A for a more in-depth discussion of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland 
Security. 
130 Kaspersky Lab, 909 F.3d at 463. 
131 Id. at 461. 
132 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 684. 
133 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 351. 
134 Id. at 344–45. 
135 Id. at 345. 
136 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 314. 
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Edison’s monetary loss could not be maintained under Nixon’s traditional or historical 
punishment factor.137  It is further unlikely that such injury could be found under either 
Nixon’s functional or motivational factors.  Thus, corporate “injury” in terms of 
financial loss is not comparable to the individual “punishment” that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause seeks to guard against.  Therefore, the failure of the Second Circuit 
to clarify how the only injury Con Edison sustained—in the form of financial losses—
is comparable to the type of punishment prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.   
 
D.       BECAUSE CORPORATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO STATE AND 
FEDERAL REGULATION, THE PROTECTIONS OF THE BILL OF 
ATTAINDER CLAUSE TO THE CORPORATE ENTITY IS NOT 
REASONABLE 
 
Corporations possess specialized privileges due to their corporate status that 
mandate a certain degree of regulation from state and federal regulatory bodies.  The 
legitimate state and federal interests in regulating corporate conduct require that the 
corporation have less privacy rights than a natural person.  Extension of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause to the corporation would not advance those interests and would be 
unreasonable.  This Section discusses the implications, first, of state regulation of 
corporations and, second, of federal regulation of corporations.  It then discusses the 
effects of state and federal regulation upon the corporation’s rights, such as privacy.   
First, a corporation is limited by the powers granted to it in its charter and by the 
right of the state of its incorporation to regulate it.  In 1819, the Supreme Court 
described a corporation as an “artificial being . . . existing only in contemplation of 
law” and “possess[ing] only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”138  In 1950, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co. stated that “law-enforcing agencies have a 
legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law 
and the public interest.”139  Thus, privacy rights differ substantially.  The Court in 
Morton Salt further noted that corporations are not equal with individuals in the 
enjoyment of a right to privacy because corporations are “endowed with public 
attributes . . . have a collective impact upon society . . . derive the privilege of acting 
as artificial entities,” and are allowed to “engag[e] in interstate commerce.”140  And, as 
the Court reasoned, with these “[f]avors” from the government come “an enhanced 
measure of regulation.”141   
The Second Circuit in Con Edison acknowledged this as well, noting that 
corporations have been denied constitutional protections by the Supreme Court in 
instances where “competing state interests in regulating corporate conduct and 
 
137 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 351 (“We need not resolve this close question to conclude that [the 
provision] is nonetheless a bill of attainder.  Accordingly, we do not decide whether [the provision] imposes a 
traditional attainder and turn instead to the next component of the test.”). 
138 See Tr. of Dartmouth C. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 536 (1819). 
139 See United States v. Morton Salt Co. 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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investigating corporate wrongdoing” and “transparency” were at stake.142  The Second 
Circuit had even listed several legitimate state purposes in the provision that Con 
Edison attacked, such as preventing ratepayers from absorbing the costs, deterring 
similar conduct, regulating monopolies, and protecting public health.143  However, it 
disregarded these above-listed nonpunitive purposes.  Instead, the Second Circuit 
distinguished Supreme Court holdings that discussed the state’s retained “visitatorial 
power”144 over corporations and the state’s “legitimate right”145 in regulating corporate 
behavior by holding that the New York legislature was “inflicting punishment” and 
ignoring the administrative process to follow to vindicate the alleged wrongdoing.146  
However, language from the Supreme Court indicates that courts are sometimes unable 
or unwilling to get involved since to do so would be to interfere with the rights of states 
to regulate and investigate corporations in their jurisdiction.  The failure of the Second 
Circuit in Con Edison to address this fact and reasoning from prior Supreme Court 
opinions was erroneous and makes the holding in Con Edison incomplete. 
Second, corporations are also subject to federal regulation.  A corporation is in a 
unique position to use its special corporate privileges to commit unlawful acts.  It is 
obligatory upon the U.S. government to adopt standards and regulatory measures to 
ensure that corporations within U.S. jurisdiction are not abusing their power.  
Recognizing this, courts have upheld various legislative provisions against 
corporations, even claims asserting violations of the Bill of Attainder Clause because 
of Congress’ power to regulate corporations.  Excluding the Second Circuit’s opinion 
in Consolidated Edison v. Pataki,147 there are six cases from the Supreme Court and 
courts of appeals regarding the connection between corporations, bill of attainder 
claims, and legislative provisions that allegedly impair the corporation’s business 
activities, though to different extents.148  All involve a corporation that had alleged a 
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause.  The remainder of Section D outlines these 
decisions, emphasizing the duty of Congress to regulate corporations through 
legitimate legislation and the courts’ reflection of that duty in their holdings.   
The 2016 Supreme Court case Bank Markazi concerned a congressional provision 
that made a particular set of assets available to satisfy the judgments of individuals 
who had claims against Iran for its role in supporting state-sponsored terrorism.149  The 
Supreme Court held that the provision was “an exercise of congressional authority 
regarding foreign affairs, a domain in which the controlling role of the political 
branches is both necessary and proper.”150  The bill of attainder claim was therefore 
 
142 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 348. 
143 Id. at 351–52. 
144 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382–84 (1911). 
145 See Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652. 
146 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 348. 
147 See supra Part II for the complete analysis of Consolidated Edison v. Pataki. 
148 See generally Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 909 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 
2018); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016); ACORN, 618 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2010); 
BellSouth II, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998); SBC Communications, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998); BellSouth 
I, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
149 See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320. 
150 Id. at 485. 
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unsuccessful.151  In addition to this Supreme Court holding, lower courts have also 
heard issues of corporate bill of attainder claims and have all based their holdings in 
some respect on the legitimate purposes of Congress in enacting the legislative 
provision at issue. 
Three opinions concerning corporate bill of attainder claims, all decided in 1998, 
challenged certain provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The D.C. 
Circuit issued two of these opinions, both concerning the same parties but asserting 
violations of different provisions of the Telecommunications Act: BellSouth I and 
BellSouth II.152  First, in BellSouth I, BellSouth Corporation challenged Section 274 of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a bill of attainder because it limited the ability 
of its Bell operating companies (“BOCs”) to provide electronic publishing.153  Second, 
in BellSouth II, BellSouth Corporation brought another action against the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) claiming that Section 271 prevented them 
from providing in-region long distance telephone service without satisfying statutory 
criteria.154  The D.C. Circuit held that the provision at issue in BellSouth I represented 
a “conventional response to commonly perceived risks of anticompetitive behavior.”155  
Further, the provision in BellSouth II was a “rational and nonpunitive congressional 
enactment that serves to open telecommunications markets” and to prevent 
monopolies, which is “no different than numerous regulatory measures aimed at 
particular industries that have never been held to inflict punishment.”156  In addition, 
the Fifth Circuit decided in SBC Communications v. FCC that certain provisions of the 
Telecommunication Act—which placed restrictions on twenty subsidiaries—were 
bills of attainder.157   
In 2010, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Acorn Institute, Inc. v. United States 
involved a corporation that was legislatively barred from receiving federal funding 
after it allegedly engaged in tax evasion, voter fraud, etc., and subsequently alleged 
that this provision was a bill of attainder.158  The only reference the Second Circuit 
made to Consolidated Edison v. Pataki—also from the Second Circuit—was an 
acknowledgment that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule 
on the issue, we have held that the scope of the ‘specification of the affected persons’ 
element includes corporate entities.”159  Nevertheless, there was no violation of the 
Clause in Acorn and the Circuit instead determined that the provision was a legitimate 
exercise by Congress to carry out its spending powers by “suspend[ing] federal funds 
to an organization that has admitted to significant mismanagement”160  The most recent 
corporate bill of attainder case was also from the D.C. Circuit—Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. 
 
151 Id. at 478 n.14. 
152 See generally BellSouth II, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998); BellSouth I, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
153 See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 60. 
154 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 680. 
155 See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 65–66. 
156 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 680, 685–86. 
157 See SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 229. 
158 See ACORN, 618 F.3d at 129–30. 
159 Id. at 136 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 349 (2002)). 
160 See ACORN, 618 F.3d at 137. 
  
 Journal of Legislation 297 
United States Dept. of Homeland Security.161  In 2018, Kaspersky Lab, a Russian-based 
corporation, challenged the 2018 NDAA, which banned the use of Kaspersky products 
by U.S. governmental agencies.162  The D.C. Circuit in Kaspersky Lab, Inc. upheld the 
legislation because Congress had the legitimate purpose of protecting the United States 
from the threats of Kaspersky products, making the legislation at issue “prophylactic, 
not punitive.”163   
Thus, all six holdings noted contained an analysis of Congress’ authority to 
regulate the corporate entity based on legitimate, federal regulatory purposes.  The 
Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison, too, found multiple non-punitive purposes.164  
After noting these possible non-punitive purposes, the Second Circuit nevertheless 
concluded that nothing “other than punishment” can account for the New York 
legislature’s enactment.165  Therefore, the Circuit held that the provision was a “burden 
that was obviously disproportionate to the harm caused.”166  But the Second Circuit 
failed to distinguish the above cases with the legislative provision at issue in 
Consolidated Edison.167  Specifically, the holdings in such cases are all representative 
of Congress’ obligation to regulate corporations, carry out its constitutional powers, or 
safeguard the nation from national security threats—none of which have found a 
violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause.  The Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison 
was wrong to so easily gloss over and dismiss the legitimate reasons set forth by 
Congress for the provision’s enactment without an analysis.  Thus, the Circuit’s 
cursory analysis was insufficient to justify a finding of punitive intent in Consolidated 
Edison. 
 
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES 
MANDATE THAT THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE NOT EXTEND TO 
CORPORATIONS 
 
Part IV presents an alternative argument as to why the Bill of Attainder Clause 
should not extend to corporations.  Corporate standing under the Clause would 
interfere with national security interests and foreign trade policies in three main 
respects: (1) Congress’ ability to sanction; (2) Congress’ power to regulate foreign 
commerce and facilitate trade; and (3) the ability of the political branches to respond 
swiftly to sensitive foreign policy issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 See infra, Part IV.A. for a more in-depth discussion of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
162 See Kaspersky Lab, 909 F.3d at 452–53. 
163 Id. at 458. 
164 See Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 351–52. 
165 Id. at 350. 
166 Id. at 354. 
167 Excluding the later-decided cases Kaspersky, Bank Markazi, and ACORN.  
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A.       CONGRESS’ ABILITY TO SANCTION 
 
If Huawei could challenge the 2019 NDAA with a corporate bill of attainder claim, 
the courts could effectively become the final legislatures at determining when a 
corporation ought or ought not to be sanctioned.  Such claims asserted by corporations 
would hinder the use of sanctions as an effective means of responding to national 
security threats against the United States and are more appropriately categorized as 
political issues not to be questioned by the Judiciary.  Therefore, even if it is contended 
that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to corporations, national security interests, like 
Congress’ ability to effectively sanction, must be considered by the courts.  Neither 
the denial of noncontractual benefits nor the severity of the punishment imposed can 
affect Congress’ power to sanction.  For instance, the Supreme Court in Flemming v. 
Nestor noted the provision disqualifying deportees from the receipt of Social Security 
benefits while they are not lawfully in this country is a “mere denial of a noncontractual 
governmental benefit” with “[n]o affirmative disability or restraint [] imposed.”168  
Further, the Supreme Court in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest 
Group had observed that the “severity of a sanction is not determinative of its character 
as punishment” when deciding whether the provision at issue violates the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.169 
There is one case on point with sanctions and corporate bill of attainder claims: 
Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security.170  The D.C. Circuit 
decided Kaspersky in 2018.  In Kaspersky, a section of the 2018 NDAA—enacted by 
Congress—banned the use of Kaspersky products by governmental agencies after 
concerns that Kaspersky’s ties to Russia were “a threat to the very systems [Kaspersky 
products] is meant to protect.”171  The provision prohibiting the use of Kaspersky 
products read as follows: “No department, agency, organization, or other element of 
the Federal Government may use . . . any hardware, software, or services developed or 
provided, in whole or in part, by—(1) Kaspersky Lab . . . .”172  Kaspersky—the 
Russian-headquartered cybersecurity corporation—sued alleging a violation of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause in the U.S. Constitution.173  The D.C. Circuit began by noting that 
the analysis between natural persons and corporations will always be “strained at best” 
because there is little precedent on the Clause’s applicability to corporations.174  
Nevertheless, the court “assume[d] that the Bill of Attainder Clause extends to 
corporations” and thereafter denied relief to Kaspersky because the provision was 
“necessary to protect federal computer systems from Russian cyber-threats.”175  The 
D.C. Circuit noted that even though “Congress can do more than identify threats 
approaching at a distance and wait patiently for those threats to cause empirically 
provable consequences,” it was justified in not doing so based on the “magnitude of 
 
168 See Flemming, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). 
169 See Selective Service System, 468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984). 
170 See generally Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
171 See Kaspersky Lab, 909 F.3d at 451–52. 
172 Id. at 452–53. 
173 Id. at 453. 
174 Id. at 462. 
175 Id. at 450, 454. 
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the harm” that an intrusion could have upon the United States by compromising its 
federal systems.176  Therefore, the legislative provision in Kaspersky imposing the 
sanction was a “reasonable and balanced response”177 by Congress based on national 
security threats even though alternative measures were available. 
Here, continuing with the assumption that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to 
corporations, securing and safeguarding the intelligence of the United States from 
foreign cybersecurity threats is a legitimate congressional purpose.  The judiciary has 
no choice but to be convinced that such a provision’s passage was based on legitimate 
purposes.  Therefore, it would be unreasonable for the judiciary to intervene.  Futile 
searches into the hidden meaning and subjective intent behind the enactment of Section 
889 of the 2019 NDAA is an impermissible endeavor.  As the Supreme Court strongly 
asserted in Flemming v. Nestor, “[j]udicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at 
best a hazardous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective 
manifestations it becomes a dubious affair indeed.”178  Here, Congress has set forth 
legitimate reasons for the legislation’s passage.  Section 889 cites to “the purpose of 
public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of 
critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.”179  This must be accepted 
as sufficient and legitimate by the courts. 
 
B.       CONGRESS’ POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE AND 
FACILITATE TRADE 
 
Corporate bill of attainder claims represent an obstacle to congressional action to 
address foreign policy issues such as trade law.  Should the protections of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause extend to corporations, Huawei could effectively challenge 
legislation that it feels unfairly disadvantages it.  This could, in turn, affect the ability 
of the United States to respond to unfair trade practices of other foreign powers such 
as China by limiting Congress’ permissible methods—enacting legislation—to assert 
pressure campaigns against those foreign powers.  In other words, the means utilized 
by Congress to deal with the unfair labor and trade practices of China would be 
impermissibly curtailed to the point where Congress is no longer able to swiftly react 
to foreign relations difficulties.  For instance, China has for quite some time utilized a 
system of unfair trade practices, which includes “forced technology transfers and 
intellectual property theft.”180  Therefore, applying the Bill of Attainder Clause to the 
corporate entity would frustrate this purpose and ability of Congress to promptly 
respond.   
In 2016, the Supreme Court stressed in Bank Markazi v. Peterson that legislation 
involving foreign affairs is “a domain in which the controlling role of the political 
 
176 Id. at 458 (“Congress’s decision to remove Kaspersky from federal networks represents a reasonable 
and balanced response.  Section 1634 is prophylactic, not punitive.”). 
177 Id. 
178 See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. 
179 See 2019 NDAA § 889. 
180 See David Lawder and Susan Heavy, U.S. Blacklists China's Huawei as Trade Dispute Clouds Global 
Outlook, REUTERS (May 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/us-blacklists-chinas-
huawei-as-trade-dispute-clouds-global-outlook-idUSKCN1SL2DI. 
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branches is both necessary and proper.”181  In pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the 
political branches have regulated foreign affairs by a variety of means and such 
measures have never constituted “invasions upon the Article III judicial power.”182  
Therefore, as noted, Congress has the power to legislate against corporations that pose 
a threat to the national security and intelligence interests of the United States and it 
must do so to effectively respond to foreign threats such as trade law disputes.   
 
C.      THE ABILITY OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES TO RESPOND SWIFTLY TO 
SENSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 
 
The Huawei situation both coincides and is a direct consequence of the growing 
perceived threat from China.  Congress determined that the use of Huawei products by 
federal agencies poses a threat to the cybersecurity of the United States and cited to 
possible Chinese influence, relying on national security reasons to justify its actions.183  
The U.S. government here is focused on the “increasingly authoritarian nature of the 
Chinese government” and “the fading line between independent business and the 
state.”184  It has already responded to these perceived threats by increasing tariffs on 
Chinese goods, imposing investment restrictions, and indicting Chinese nationals 
accused of “hacking and cyberespionage.”185  If Huawei could challenge these actions 
with a bill of attainder claim and potentially satisfy the Clause’s standards, the security 
and intelligence of the United States will be put at risk and, with it, the ability of the 
U.S. government to promptly react to sensitive policy issues by these foreign powers. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that threats to national security are a legitimate 
reason for passing legislation to combat those concerns against the United States.  For 
instance, in 2010 the Supreme Court was convinced that Congress was justified in 
passing the provision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project because Congress had 
made “specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international 
terrorism.”186  Similarly, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 
decided seven years later, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]t is ultimately 
necessary . . . to balance the equities—to explore the relative harms to applicant and 
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respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.”187  This mandates that 
Congress’ ability to act suitability and promptly not be hindered.  Further, the Supreme 
Court in Bank Markazi had also stated that the political branches have a considerable 
measure of control over the nation’s foreign relations and have throughout history 
exercised such control “as exigencies arose.”188  Any conclusion to the contrary fails 
to recognize the importance of remaining abreast of sensitive foreign policy changes 
and reacting accordingly. 
Thus, based on the above, extending the protections of the Bill of Attainder Clause 
to the corporate entity would present severe obstacles with respect to Congress’ ability 
to sanction, regulate foreign commerce and trade, and quickly respond to foreign 
policy issues. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Huawei’s chief complaint against the U.S. government alleged violations of the 
Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  This allegation raises interesting 
questions about the applicability of the Clause to corporations.  The Supreme Court 
has never held that the Bill of Attainder Clause applies to corporations and lower courts 
have largely assumed it does.  With the exception of the Second Circuit, the lower 
courts have ruled against the corporate claimant on grounds unrelated to the Clause.  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Consolidated Edison stands as a notable exception 
on bill of attainder claims brought by corporate claimants.  Decided in 2002, the 
Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison held not only that corporations are protected 
by the Clause to the same extent as individuals, but also that the corporate claimant—
Consolidated Edison—had sufficiently alleged that New York passed a bill of 
attainder.  Consolidated Edison became the first court to find a violation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause in favor of the corporate entity. 
The prevailing assumption that the Clause applies to the corporate entity is 
unwarranted and bears re-examination.  This article has argued that—contrary to the 
prevailing assumptions of the courts as well as the literature in the academic 
community—the Bill of Attainder Clause is not applicable to corporations.  It has made 
two arguments: (1) the Bill of Attainder Clause protects only personal dignitary 
interests, and (2) national security interests and foreign trade policies mandate that the 
Bill of Attainder Clause not extend to corporations.   
“Regarding the first argument, this article attacked both holdings of the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Consolidated Edison.”  Consolidated Edison’s first holding that 
the Clause protects corporations is flawed because the Second Circuit failed to 
consider the history of the Clause as well as prior Supreme Court decisions finding 
violations of the Clause, all of which have involved individuals.  Specifically, the 
history of the Clause has revealed an individual-based standpoint rooted in death and 
banishment under English law and subsequently outlawed by the Founding Fathers in 
the U.S. Constitution to protect the liberty of U.S. society and U.S. government.  
 
187 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643, 651 (2017) (quoting Barnes v. E-
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Further, all five cases where the Supreme Court has found a violation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause have involved the dignitary interests of an individual and legislation 
that impugned the individual’s or group of individuals’ reputation(s) with respect to 
their profession.  Thus, this history and precedent demonstrate the original intent for 
the Clause to be invoked only for the protection of the natural person.   
Consolidated Edison’s second holding and analysis that the New York legislature 
passed a bill of attainder by targeting Con Edison for punishment is incomplete 
because the Second Circuit’s analysis did not consider several distinguishing 
characteristics of the corporate entity such as corporate injury and corporate regulation.  
In other words, the only injuries a corporation can sustain are economic injuries and, 
because corporations are subject to both state and federal regulation, corporate 
extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause is unreasonable.  Specifically, even though 
corporations can sue for defamation, they lack the ability to sustain damages for injury 
to their dignitary interests and can only suffer damages in the form of monetary loss.  
Further, the act of incorporation mandates that both state and federal regulatory 
agencies be involved in the affairs of the corporation, which inevitably requires that 
the corporation surrender some of its privacy.  Thus, these distinguishing 
characteristics between the natural person and corporate entity lead to the conclusion 
that the Bill of Attainder Clause cannot apply to corporations. 
Regarding the second subsidiary argument, this article presented an alternative 
theory as to why corporate extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause is irrational.  
Specifically, it contended that national security interests and foreign trade policies 
would negatively impact the United States in three respects: (1) Congress’ ability to 
sanction, (2) Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce and facilitate trade, and 
(3) the ability of the political branches to respond swiftly to sensitive foreign policy 
issues.  Specifically, Congress must retain the power to enact legislation and sanction 
unhindered by corporate protections under the Bill of Attainder Clause.  Congress’ 
power to regulate foreign commerce cannot be compromised by the ability of 
corporations to defeat legitimate legislation.  Further, Congress must at all times be 
given the flexibility to respond to foreign issues, such as those raised by both Huawei’s 
alleged cybersecurity threats as well as China’s trade disputes with the United States.  
If Huawei were able to assert a violation of the Clause against the U.S. government, 
Congress’ powers to sanction, regulate foreign commerce, and react to foreign policy 
issues would be hindered.  Thus, corporate extension of the Bill of Attainder Clause 
would render the imperative of considering these international issues useless. 
In conclusion, the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution only protects 
the personal dignitary interests of the individual and corporate extension of the Clause 
cannot be maintained due to Congress’ interests in preventing interference with foreign 
relations and sensitive foreign policy issues.   
        
 
 
 
 
 
